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This paper develops a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with interactions be-
tweenanheterogeneousbankingsectorandotherprivateagents. Weintroduceendogenous
default probabilities for both ﬁrms and banks, and allow for bank regulation and liquidity
injection into the interbank market. Our aim is to understand the importance of supervisory
and monetary authorities to restore ﬁnancial stability. The model is calibrated against real
data and used for simulations. We show that liquidity injections reduce ﬁnancial instabil-
ity but have ambiguous effects on output ﬂuctuations. The model also conﬁrms the partial
equilibrium literature results on the procyclicality of Basel II.
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In neoclassical models, the capital market is perfectly competitive and investment is simply
determined by the marginal cost of capital. More fundamentally, in these models, the capital
market is not distorted by taxes, transaction or bankruptcy costs, imperfect information or
any other friction which limits access to credit, so the Modigliani and Miller (1958) theorem
holds meaning that ﬁnancial and credit market conditions become irrelevant and cannot affect
real economic outcomes. However, credit market imperfections are often considered a crucial
contributing factor to the severity of crises, for instance during the Great Depression or more
recently the subprime crises and associated ﬁnancial turmoil. This central role of the credit
market may in turn explain why banking remains so heavily regulated despite the signiﬁcant
deregulation in recent decades in many other industries. This may also explain why central
banks react so rapidly to ﬁnancial crises, despite the risk of creating moral hazard.
The main objective of this paper is to build a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model
with imperfections in the credit market, such that the Modigliani and Miller (1958) theorem
no longer holds. More precisely, following Goodhart et al. (2006), we develop an heteroge-
neous banking sector and allow for bank regulation, liquidity injections and endogenous de-
fault probabilities for both ﬁrms and banks, with default costs. We embed this banking sector
representation in an otherwise standard real business cycle model (hereafter RBC, see King
and Rebelo (1999) for an extensive exposition). We start from the RBC model because it is now
widely accepted as a benchmark in the literature. Moreover, in the limiting case of no default
ratesandnosupervisoryandmonetaryauthorities, ourmodelgeneratesresultssimilartothose
of the RBC model. We then develop a plausible calibration and use our model to understand
the role of supervisory and monetary authorities in restoring ﬁnancial stability.
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) introduce credit market frictions through asymmetry of infor-
mation between lenders and borrowers as well as agency costs. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997),
Bernanke et al. (1999) (BGG hereafter) or Cooley et al. (2004) adopt this approach in a dy-
namic general equilibrium model and assess the quantitative implications of credit frictions
for the real economy. BGG show that their model generates a procyclical pattern in the net
worth of ﬁrms/borrowers, which in turn implies a countercyclical risk premium that acts as
a ﬁnancial accelerator. These models only focus on the demand side of the credit market and
banks are limited to act as intermediaries between households (lenders) and ﬁrms (borrowers).
Meh and Moran (2004) argue that banks themselves are also subject to frictions in raising loan-
able funds. They extend the BGG model and show that the supply side of the credit market
(bank balance sheet) also contributes to shock propagation. However, their capital-asset ratio
is market-determined rather than originating from regulatory requirements. Markovic (2006)
develops a closely related model in which banks must raise capital reserves (or reduce their
2loan supply) to fulﬁll regulatory requirements. Results suggest that the bank capital channel
contributes signiﬁcantly to the monetary transmission mechanism, along with the corporate
balance sheet channel. Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) formulate a quantitative model to
assess the relevance of a detailed banking sector (and hence the importance of distinguish-
ing among the various short term interest rates) for monetary policy. Miyake and Nakamura
(2007) provide a different approach by using an overlapping generations model with strategic
complementarities between bank equity and the capital of other ﬁrms in the economy. In the
short run, bank capital regulation ampliﬁes the effects of a productivity shock. In the long run,
tougher capital requirements boost bank capital.1
All the papers mentioned above use an homogeneous agent to represent the banking sector,
which can be either a set of identical and perfectly competitive banks or a single monopolist.
But Goodhart et al. (2006) warn that ignoring the existence of the interbank market obscures
all the relationships between banks which interest supervisory authorities and central banks.
Goodhart et al. (2005) develop a model including a commercial banking sector with an ex-
plicit interbank market and bank endogenous default rates. Since the main focus of their paper
is ﬁnancial fragility, a ﬁnancial regulator imposes a range of penalties in case of default or
non respect of capital adequacy ratio. A central bank is also included on the interbank mar-
ket. However, if the “core” banking sector is extensively developed and micro-founded, the
“periphery” agents are modeled through reduced form equations. In addition, this is only a
2-period model which cannot track dynamic effects of shocks or policies.2 They calibrate the
model using UK banking data and do not ﬁnd serious contagion in the interbank market. They
show that contagion is diminished if the central bank targets interest rates.
Our model includes one agent that borrows (representative ﬁrm) and one that lends (represen-
tative household), as well as a competitive banking market which is composed of two banks (a
net lender and a net borrower on the interbank market). As in Goodhart et al. (2005), we as-
sume that agents (ﬁrms and banks) may default on their ﬁnancial obligations, subject to default
costs. Our model is fully microfounded in the sense that all agents maximise proﬁts or utility
under constraints. Moreover, we have capital regulation rules set by a supervisory authority
and we allow for monetary policy through liquidity injections into the interbank market. We
therefore have a banking sector representation close to Goodhart et al. (2005), but we embed
it in a fully micro-founded dynamic (intertemporal) stochastic general equilibrium model. As
underlined in Borio and Zhu (2007), this is the only framework in which dynamic interactions
1This literature review is far from being exhaustive and we concentrate on dynamic general equilibrium models.
For an extended survey, see for instance VanHoose (2008).
2Decisions under uncertainty (2 possible future scenarios) are taken in period 1. In period 2 the state of the world
is revealed and contracts are settled.
3between agents and policy effects can be properly assessed.
We use average historical values on interest rates, default rates as well as banking and macroe-
conomic aggregated data to calibrate the model.3 We introduce a productivity shock (TFP
shock) and we simulate the model under different policy regimes: no liquidity injections vs.
discretionary liquidity injections, and Basel I regulations vs. Basel II regulations (risk-sensitive
own fund requirements). We ﬁrst show that endogenous default rates generate countercyclical
risk premia acting as ﬁnancial accelerators, and that our model is able to reproduce stylized
facts on interest rates and default rates. Second, we conﬁrm the partial equilibrium literature
results on the procyclicality of a Basel II regime. Finally, looking at optimal monetary policy, we
show that liquidity injections reduce ﬁnancial instability but have ambiguous effects on output
volatility.
Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 describes the banking sector in Luxembourg and
explains the calibration. Section 4 provides simulations and presents the main results. Section 5
concludes.
2 Model
We depart from the standard RBC model with a perfectly competitive capital (or credit) market
between households/lenders and ﬁrms/borrowers by introducing a banking sector. More pre-
cisely, we assume that households deposit savings with a bank and that ﬁrms borrow capital
from a bank. In this setup, bank deposits (from households) may differ from bank loans (to
ﬁrms) and the interest rate on deposits (lending rate) may differ from the interest rate on loans
(borrowing rate) generating an interest rate spread.4
A second departure from the standard model is the introduction of an interbank market: banks
receiving deposits from households (excess liquidity) are different from banks supplying loans
to ﬁrms (liquidity shortage) and equilibrium is restored through the interbank market.5 The
interbank interest rate is free to move (no central bank intervention) or alternatively, the central
3The model is calibrated against Luxembourg data because of the importance of the banking sector in this coun-
try and the availability of data.
4Since bank loans are risky whereas bank deposits are not (see below), the interest rate spread is called risk
premium.
5Again, interbank loans are risky (see below) and the interest rate spread with the deposit rate includes a risk
premium. In the subsequent analysis, we call “borrowing banks” those who borrow on the interbank market and
lend to ﬁrms, and “lending banks” those who lend on the interbank market and collect deposits from households.
Alternatively, we could argue we have two types of specialized banks: deposit banks collecting deposits and mer-
chant banks lending to ﬁrms.
4bank may inject or remove liquidity to inﬂuence the interbank rate.
We also introduce endogenous probabilities of default for ﬁrms and borrowing banks. In other
words, a ﬁrm problem may increase its default rate, producing bank repayment problems on
the interbank market. It is worth noting that we do not have a default possibility for the lend-
ing banks. We believe this is a fair representation of reality because a deposit guarantee scheme
exists in all OECD countries.6 Finally, we have a supervisory authority, ﬁxing own fund re-
quirements for banks. These requirements may be independent from the business cycle (Basel
I) or risk-sensitive (Basel II).
We therefore have six agents in our model: ﬁrms, borrowing banks, lending banks, house-
holds, a supervisory authority and a central bank. The relationships between these six agents
are summarized in Figure 1. Without defaults and hence without supervision, the distinction
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Figure 1: Flows between agents
2.1 Firms
We assume risk-neutral ﬁrms maximising proﬁts π
f
t .7 The ﬁrms may default with a probability
1 − αt. As Dubey et al. (2005) or Elul (2008), we do not exclude defaulters but we discourage
default through costs, i.e. ﬁrms choose whether to repay or to bear costs for defaulting. Costs
are both non pecuniary (disutility or “social stigma”: reputation losses, pangs of conscience)
and pecuniary (higher search costs to obtain new loans because of the bad reputation). The
6As a result, no major OECD bank defaulted on its obligations to depositors over the last decades.
7Risk-neutrality for ﬁrms is a usual assumption in the RBC literature.














































˜ βt+s = βs UCt+s
UCt
. (4)
Equation (2) is the law of motion for capital. Capital Kt depreciates at a rate τ and ﬁrms bor-
row Lb
t at a price 1/(1 + rb
t) to reﬁll their capital stock.9 Equation (3) deﬁnes proﬁt. The ﬁrms
produce goods using capital and labour Nt as input, and ǫt is a total factor productivity shock.
They pay a wage wt to workers and reimburse their previous period borrowings Lb
t−1. They
choose what proportion αt of their previous borrowing they want to repay, knowing that they
will have to pay tomorrow a quadratic search cost on any defaulted amount (and also bear
a disutility). Finally, we assume a quadratic borrowing adjustment cost similar to the invest-
ment cost of the DSGE literature (see for instance Smets and Wouters (2003) or Christiano et al.
(2005)). Firms are ultimately owned by households and their discount factor is therefore given
by equation (4), where UCt represents the marginal utility of consumption and β the discount
factor.
The ﬁrst order conditions are developed in Appendix A.
2.2 Banks borrowing from the interbank market (merchant banks)
Merchant banks borrow Dbd
t from the interbank market and lend Lb
t to ﬁrms. They also invest
Bb
t in their market book and keep Fb
t as own funds. Their balance sheet is therefore:
Assets Liabilities
Loans to ﬁrms (Lb) Own funds (Fb)
Market book (Bb) Interbank deposits (Dbd)





where Z may be any variable or combination of variables. Our simpliﬁed notation is however easier to read.
9The interest rate is predetermined meaning it is ﬁxed (contract between between ﬁrms and banks) at the bor-
rowing time t and not at the repayment time t + 1. We think this is a plausible representation of reality. Moreover,
without predetermination, the endogenous default choice would be irrelevant because it would be totally offset by
an interest rate increase.
6We assume risk-averse banks maximising the net present value of the ﬂows of expected prof-
its πb
t and having disutility from its default rate 1 − δt.10 We follow Goodhart et al. (2005) by
assuming a positive utility for the buffer of own funds Fb
t above the minimum capital require-
ment imposed by the ﬁnancial supervisory authority which ﬁxes the coverage ratio of risky
assets k, together with ¯ ωt and ˜ ω the respective weights on loans and on the market book (and
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with ζb, ξb and υb ∈ [0,1]. Equation (6) states that own funds are increased each period by the
share υb of proﬁts that are not redistributed to the households-shareholders. Furthermore, a
small ﬁxed proportion ξb of the own funds are put in an insurance fund managed by a pub-
lic authority. Equation (7) deﬁnes the period proﬁt. The bank borrows Dbd
t on the interbank
market at a price 1/(1 + it). It chooses the fraction δt of past borrowing it wants to pay back,
knowing that it will have to pay tomorrow a quadratic search cost on her defaulted amount.12
Because of the existence of the insurance fund, the bank is able to recover a fraction of the ﬁrms’
defaulted amount. The last variable on the right-hand side collects the market book terms. The
market book net return is (1 + ρt)Bb
t−1 − Bb
t. In this paper we assume an exogenous market
book volume Bb
t = ¯ Bb and an exogenous return ¯ ρ, hence φb
t = ¯ ρ ¯ Bb.
The ﬁrst order conditions are developed in Appendix A.
2.3 Banks lending to the interbank market (deposit banks)
Deposit banks lend Dbs
t to the interbank market and receive deposits Dl
t from households. They
also invest Bl
t in the market book and keep Fl
t as own funds. Their balance sheet is therefore:
10See for instance Goodhart et al. (2005) for a similar risk-aversion assumption. As was the case for ﬁrms, default
disutility may represent “social stigma”.
11In practice, the regulator sets a minimum capital requirement and penalties are paid in case of violation. Since
we want to rule out a corner solution in our model, we simply assume that banks want to keep a buffer above the
required minimum in order to avoid penalties. This buffer assumption does not seem unrealistic and is found in
data (see section 3.2). As underlined in Borio and Zhu (2007), crossing the capital threshold is extremely costly for
a bank (restrictive supervisory actions, market reaction, reputation losses) and would be regarded as the “kiss of
death”.
12See previous subsection for a justiﬁcation. This can be also interpreted as a penalty cost paid to the supervisory
authority.
7Assets Liabilities
Interbank loans (Dbs) Own funds (Fl)
Market book (Bl) Deposits from households (Dl)
We assume risk-averse banks maximising proﬁts πl
t. As the merchant banks, they derive util-
ity from the buffer of own funds above the capital requirement imposed by the supervisory
authority. The latter ﬁxes the coverage ratio of risky assets k, as well as ¯ ¯ ω and ˜ ω, the weights
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with ζl, ξl and υl ∈ [0,1]. Equation (9) displays the own funds dynamic: own funds Fl
t are
increased each period by the share υl of proﬁts that are not redistributed to the households-
shareholders. Furthermore, a small ﬁxed proportion ξl of the own funds are put in an insurance
fund managed by a public authority. Equation (10) deﬁnes the bank’s proﬁt. It pays a net return
rl
t/(1+rl
t) on deposits from households and receives a gross return it/(1+it) from loans on the
interbank market, the net return varying along with the merchant banks default rate (1 − δt).
Note that a fraction of the defaulted amount (by the defaulting merchant banks) is paid back
to the deposit banks from the insurance fund managed by the public authority. We assume
that the lending banks never default, that is they always repay 100% of deposits. The last
variable on the right-hand side collects the market book terms. The market book net return is
(1 + ρt)Bl
t−1 − Bl
t. In this paper we assume exogenous market book volume Bl
t = ¯ Bl and an
exogenous return ¯ ρ, hence φl
t = ¯ ρ ¯ Bl.
The ﬁrst order conditions are developed in Appendix A.
2.4 Households
As in the standard RBC literature, we assume risk-averse households maximising the utility of
consumption Ct and leisure 1− Nt. We also impose a target in deposits (households do not like
deposits differing from their long run optimal level) through a quadratic disutility term.13 The
13 We also introduce the convex disutility term for technical reasons. If χ = 0, both equations (A9) and (A12) give
the steady state for rl
t, leaving Dl
t undetermined (singular matrix). By imposing χ > 0, we force equation (A12)
to determine the steady state of Dl
t. Note that in our calibration, χ is kept close to zero. Alternatively, we could































= wtNt + Dl
t−1 + π
f
t + (1− υb)πb
t + (1− υl)πl
t. (12)
The ﬁrst order conditions are developed in Appendix A.
2.5 Central bank
In the long run, we assume equilibrium in the interbank market, that is Dbd = Dbs. However,





The liquidity operation Mt follows a simpliﬁed McCallum (1994) rule:
Mt = ν (it − ¯ i), (14)
with ν ≥ 0, such that Mt increases (resp. decreases) when the interbank rate is higher (resp.
lower) than the desired value ¯ i.14 If ν = 0, there is no central bank intervention and the inter-
bank interest rate clears the interbank market.15
2.6 Supervisory authority
The supervisory authority ﬁxes the capital requirement ratio k and the weights ¯ ωt, ¯ ¯ ω and ˜ ω
associated with the different kinds of risky assets. We assume that under Basel I regulations,
all weights are constant and in particular ¯ ωt = ¯ ω. Basel II regulations offer more sophisticated
and informative measures of risks and capital adequacy. In particular, in our model, we assume
that the credit weight associated to loans to ﬁrms is risk-sensitive. If the expectations of ﬁrm
default increase, the associated weight also increases:
introduce a bank production function and assume that Dl
t/(1+rl
t) deposits only produce (Dl
t/(1+rl
t))λ assets. As
long as λ  = 1, this would allow equation (A9) to determine Dl
t at the steady state.
14Since Mt = 0 in the long run, ¯ i must be equal to the equilibrium value of the interbank rate, i.e. ¯ i = i.
15In our model, because of the long run equilibrium in the interbank market, there is no distinction between
central bank money and private bank money. In other words, interest and default rates apply to both types of
funds. Alternatively, we could assume long run disequilibrium in the interbank market (for instance demand
from borrowing ﬁrms structurally higher than supply from lending ﬁrms). In this case the central bank should
permanently supply money Mt > 0 and we could distinguish between private bank funds and central bank funds.
This alternative route would not change our main results.






with η > 0.16
2.7 Shock




3 Data and calibration
We calibrate the model on average historical real quarterly Luxembourg data (from 1995Q1 to
2007Q3). Luxembourg is an important ﬁnancial (banking) center and banking data are easily
available. We ﬁrst discuss some features about the banking sector and then explain how we
calibrate the model.
3.1 Some facts on the banking sector
Figure 2 shows the aggregate balance sheet of Luxembourg banks (see Appendix B for def-
initions of the different components and computation details). We see that (i) the interbank
market is by far the most important and represents about 50% of assets and liabilities17, (ii) the
size of the market book is also important (23% of assets), (iii) the level of deposits from house-
holds is broadly equal to the level of loans to private agents, (iv) own funds represent only 4%
of liabilities and (v) net proﬁt is even lower.
Luxembourg is an open economy and data presented in Figure 2 includes deposits and loans
from and to residents but also from and to non-residents. Since we have a closed economy
model (as does all the literature mentioned in section 1), we would like to discriminate between
residents and non-residents. Figure 3 plots the series “loans to resident ﬁrms” and “deposits
from resident households” (see Appendix B for details). For all the other series, we cannot
make the distinction. As in the aggregate data (including both residents and non-residents, see
Figure 2), deposits are broadly equal to loans. We assume that this result holds in all the other
series, i.e. that Figure 2 is still accurate if we remove all non-resident input.
16Similarly, it is obvious that we could introduce Basel II regulations on interbank loans with ¯ ¯ ωt = ¯ ¯ ω(δ/δt+1)η.
17Interbank borrowing is not exactly equal to interbank deposits (as it should be in a closed economy) because
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Figure 3: Deposits and loans from and to residents
11Figure 4 displays the evolution of yearly real interest rates on the lending market, the interbank
market and the borrowing market (see Appendix B for deﬁnitions and deﬂation methodology).
We see that the ﬂuctuations are very similar and that the lending rate is on average 3% lower
than the borrowing rate. The interbank rate always stands between the lending and the bor-














Figure 4: Evolution of yearly real interest rates
Finally we compute, using the Z-score method, a default probability for banks (probability that
the debt is higher than the own funds, see Appendix C for details). We see in Figure 5 that this
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Figure 5: Interbank rate and default probability
123.2 Calibration
We use the facts just described to deﬁne our quarterly calibration. From Figures 4 and 5, we
derive the average values for the quarterly real interest rates and the bank default probability:
rb = 1.10% (borrowing rate), i = 0.34% (interbank rate), rl = 0.14% (lending rate) and 1 −
δ = 0.50% (bank default probability). We assume that the market book is mainly invested in
European shares. The average real yearly return of the Dow Jones EURO Stoxx from 1995Q1 to
2007Q3 is about 9.5% so we ﬁx our quarterly return ¯ ρ = 2%. From Figures 2 and 3, we impose
that Lb = Dl (deposits=loans) and that Dbs = Dbd = 3 × Lb (large size of the interbank market
relative to customer loans and deposits). In Figure 2, the market book is about twice as large as
the loan volume. However, in our model, this is not sufﬁcient to generate a positive proﬁt for
the borrowing bank. To obtain a sufﬁciently high proﬁt, we need to have a market book three
times larger than loans, that is ¯ Bb = 3 × Lb. We assume that own funds of the borrowing bank
covers one ﬁfth of the market book (Fb = 0.2 × ¯ Bb), exactly as in the data (Figure 2) and, again
to insure a sufﬁciently high proﬁt, we require that the market book is twice higher for lending
banks (2 ¯ Bb = ¯ Bl). Finally, according to the Basel accords, minimum own funds cannot be
lower than 8% of risk-adjusted assets (k = 0.08). This minimum ratio is much lower than what
is observed in Luxembourg, suggesting that banks keep a large buffer above the minimum
ratio to avoid any risk of penalty. This is consistent with our modelisation, see footnote 11.
From all this, we obtain the discount factor β = 0.999, deposits ¯ Dl = 0.207, the default parame-
ter dδ = 0.08intheborrowingbankutilityfunctionandthepenaltycostparameter ωb = 168.50.
This last parameter implies that the total penalty cost for the borrowing bank represents 0.7%
of her own funds. Although it is difﬁcult to ﬁnd real data to compare, our ﬁgure does not seem
too unrealistic. The Basel weight for loans to private ﬁrms is ¯ ω = 0.70 and the Basel weight for
interbank loans is ¯ ¯ ω = 0.20. It implies that buffer utility for merchant and deposit banks are re-
spectively dFb = 0.06 and dFl = 0.04, and that the Basel weight for market book is ˜ ω = 1.10. All
these weighting values are consistent with the ofﬁcial Basel regulations. The interbank market
in OECD countries is almost risk-free and ¯ ¯ ω must be low. ¯ ω is consistent with the fact that
loans to ﬁrms are about 4 times riskier than loans to banks (see below). The weight of the mar-
ket book must lie between 0.2 (AAA investments) and 1.5 (riskiest investments). Since we have
our market book is only composed of European shares, ˜ ω = 1.10 seems reasonable. Finally, we
assume that 1% of own funds is put every quarter into the insurance fund (ξb = ξl = 0.01),
which implies that 10% of proﬁts are devoted to own funds (υb = υl = 0.10), and that 50% of
defaulted amounts are reimbursed because of this insurance fund (ζb = ζl = 0.50).
The consumption utility function U is logarithmic. Employment (or total hours) ¯ N is normal-
ized to 0.2 as in standard RBC models, which gives ¯ m = 3.641.18 Again, as usual in RBC
18On average, we work about 20% of total available hours: 0.2 ∼ = (40× 42)/(52× 7× 24).




t is Cobb-Douglas with labour share =
2/3, that is 1 −   = 2/3, and K/F = 10. We ﬁx the ﬁrm’s repayment rate at 98%, meaning
that the default probability of the ﬁrm is around 4 times higher than the default probability of
the bank. Although we do not have speciﬁc data for ﬁrm default, we believe that this seems
realistic. Finally, we set the capital depreciation rate τ = 3.2%. Related studies usually assume
a capital depreciation of 2.5%. However, in our model, such a value would imply a negative
search cost. Increasing the depreciation rate gives γ = 142.90, which entails total default costs
for ﬁrms of 0.2% of output. Our calibration also implies that the weight parameter df = 0.08 in
the ﬁrm utility function and that ﬁrm proﬁts represent 1.2% of output.
The remaining parameters to calibrate are dynamic and hence do not affect the steady state. θ
governs the capital demand function and is used to obtain a realistic rb
t reaction (θ = 5). The
smoothing parameter for deposits is set close to 0 (χ = 0.01) to avoid any dynamic effects (see
footnote 13). The monetary policy rule is ν = 0 (no central bank intervention) or ν = 10 (central
bank intervention to stabilise the interbank rate around ¯ i = 0.34%). Fixing η = 0 implies
that the credit weight is ﬁxed (Basel I) whereas η > 0 implies that the weight is risk-sensitive







with σǫ = 0.01.
The summary of the calibration as well as the implied values for variables are given in Tables 1
and 2.
Firms
df = 0.08 γ = 142.90   = 0.333 τ = 0.032
Banks
k = 0.08 ¯ ω = 0.7 ¯ ¯ ω = 0.2 ˜ ω = 1.10
dδ = 23.33 ωb = 168.50 ¯ Bb = 0.62 ¯ Bl = 1.24
dFb = 0.063 ζb = 0.50 ξb = 0.01 υb = 0.10
dFl = 0.036 ζl = 0.50 ξl = 0.01 υl = 0.10
¯ ρ = 0.02
Households
β = 0.999 ¯ m = 3.641 ¯ Dl = 0.207
Dynamics
θ = 5 χ = 0.01 ¯ i = 0.0034 ν = 0/10
η = 0/10 ρǫ = 0.95 σǫ = 0.01
Table 1: Calibrated parameter values
14Interest and repayment rates
rl = 0.10% i = 0.34% rb = 1.10% δ = 0.995 α = 0.98
Assets and liabilities
Dl
Lb = 1 Db
Lb = 3 Bb
Lb = 3 Fb
Bb = 0.2 Bl
Bb = 2
Production, penalty costs and proﬁts
K





Fb = 0.7% ¯ N = 0.20









Table 2: Implied values for variables
4 Simulations
In this section, we ﬁrst describe the role of the endogenous default rates, the consequence of
introducing risk-sensitive capital requirements for the banks as in the Basel II regime, and the
effects of liquidity interventions by the central bank. Then, in the RBC tradition, we check if the
model is able to reproduce some important stylized facts. We ﬁnally look at optimal monetary
policy (liquidity injections) under Basel I vs. Basel II regimes for a central bank following two
objectives: GDP stability and ﬁnancial stability.
4.1 On the role of endogenous repayment rates
The repayment rate α appears on both sides of the loans market for ﬁrms. Assuming a Cobb-
Douglas production function (see section 3.2), and posing β = 1 and df = 0 , the demand side
of the credit market represented by ﬁrst order conditions (A2), (A3) and (A4), see Appendix A,











where c =   N1− 
τ  is a constant. Equation (17) is the negatively sloped credit demand and
equation (18) indicates that the quadratic penalty costs yield the default rate (1− α) to be de-
creasing with the demand for loans. On the supply side, ﬁrst order condition (A7) simpliﬁes to
(assuming no insurance fund):
1
1+ rb = α −
dFbk ¯ ω
λb , (19)
15meaning that the interest rate rb depends negatively on the repayment rate α. The reason is
that banks are in ﬁne not interested in the gross return on loans rb/(1 + rb) but on the net
return which depends positively on the ﬁrm repayment rate. Interest rate and repayment rate
are (imperfect) substitute in the borrowing banks net return. From this we can infer that an
increase in the demand for loans following a positive shock will (i) decrease the ﬁrms default
rate, i.e. the risk incurred by the merchant bank, (ii) which yields a relatively lower price
of loans for ﬁrms and (iii) increases further their loans demand. This typically reproduces
the mechanism of a ﬁnancial accelerator. Would we impose α to be ﬁxed, the substitution
effect in the composition of the borrowing banks net return would disappear, and the ﬁnancial
accelerator would collapse.
The same mechanism can be described on the interbank market. On the demand side, ﬁrst
order conditions (A6) and (A5) simpliﬁes in the steady state to:
1
1+ i




Equation (20) is the negatively sloped demand for loans on the interbank market and equa-
tion (21) displays that the quadratic penalty cost yields a negative correlation between the de-
mand for loans Dbd and the borrowing bank default rate (1− δ), as long as dδ is sufﬁciently
small.19 On the supply side, the ﬁrst order condition (A10) becomes:
1
1+ i
= δ(1− ζl) −
dFlk ¯ ¯ ω
λl + ζl, (22)
showing the negative relationship between the borrowing banks repayment rate and the inter-
est rate obtained by the deposit banks on the interbank market explained by their (imperfect)
substitubility in the composition of the deposit banks net return. In case of a positive shock,
the increased demand for loans on the interbank market will lead to an increase in the repay-
ment rate δ, yielding a relative decrease in the interbank interest rate and a higher demand
for loans from the banks borrowing on the interbank market. This is the second accelerator of
the model. From this twin mechanism, we see that the above described model allows for a
potential contagion and ampliﬁcation of banking sector shock to the real activity and vice versa.
As an illustration, we can conduct two alternative simulations for a positive productivity shock
(TFP shock for the ﬁrm). At this stage, let us consider an economy with no central bank (no
liquidity injections) and a Basel I regime (benchmark economy). In the ﬁrst simulation the ﬁrm
and bank repayment rates are exogenous and in the second, the ﬁrm and bank repayment rates
are endogenous. Figure 6 shows the difference between the second and the ﬁrst simulations,
19More precisely, we must have (2dδ/λl − Dbd) < 0.
16that is shows the size of the ﬁnancial accelerator. The positive shock increases ﬁrm and bank
repayment rates which in turn decrease rb
t (and hence what we call risk premium in Figure 6,
that is the spread rb
t − rl
t) and it (and hence the spread it − rl
t). The falls in the risk premia act
as a double accelerator amplifying the productivity shock and stimulating further employment
and output.20 It is worth noting that the - positive - variation in bank repayment rate is very
weak compared to the - positive - variation in ﬁrm repayment rate, meaning that bank default
rate (the second ﬁnancial accelerator) does not much affect the business cycle. As a result, as
in Goodhart et al. (2005), we do not ﬁnd serious contagion through the interbank default, at
least for a productivity shock. Also note that similar ﬁnancial accelerators would happen with
liquidity injections and/or a Basel II regime.

























Figure 6: Endogenous repayment rates and size of the ﬁnancial accelerator
4.2 About risk-sensitive own funds requirement
Let us ﬁrst assess the effects of the Basel requirements for the merchant banks from a steady
state analysis. After an increase in α (positive or procyclical shock), the capital adequacy re-
quirement for the merchant banks remains unchanged under Basel I whereas capital require-
ment decreases under Basel II. In other words, a higher α implies ¯ ωII < ¯ ωI. From the loan
20This conﬁrms alternative approaches showing the importance of credit market imperfections to accelerate
shocks. See for instance Bernanke et al. (1999) with asymmetry of information and agency costs or Wasmer and
Weil (2004) with sequential search and matching processes.










λb ( ¯ ωII − ¯ ωI). (23)
It is straightforward that ¯ ωII < ¯ ωI ⇒ rb
II < rb
I, meaning that after a positive shock on α,
the borrowing rate will be lower under a Basel II regulation than under a Basel I regulation.
From the loan demand ﬁrst order condition (19), it also means that Lb and hence GDP and
employment will be further simulated with a Basel II regulation.21
Would this partial equilibrium result on the procyclicality of Basel II be conﬁrmed in our
general equilibrium setup? To answer the question, we introduce the transitory productivity
shock (16) and let ¯ ωt vary negatively with ﬁrms expected repayment rate αt+1 as displayed on
equation (15) (for η > 0). Figure 7 shows the difference between impulse response functions to
the shock under Basel II vs. Basel I regulations. We see that, under Basel II, the effect of αt+1 on
¯ ωt acts as an extra positive shock on loans supply, reducing further the borrowing rate rb
t and
accordingly, the interest rate spread rb
t − rl
t. From the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst order condition (A3), this en-
hances the demand for loans which further stimulates GDP and employment. In our dynamic
general equilibrium model, the procyclical effect of Basel II type of regulations is conﬁrmed: it
yields a multiplier effect amplifying the effects of the transitory productivity shock.
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Figure 7: Procyclical effects of Basel II
21A Basel II regulation on interbank loans (see footnote 16) would of course produce the same procyclical effects
through interactions between equations (20) and (22).
184.3 Liquidity injections
We know describe how liquidity injections affect our economy. In order to catch some intu-
ition, let us ﬁrst consider an unexpected liquidity injection by the central bank. The sudden
rise in M leads to an extra supply of loans on the interbank market and results in a drop in
the interbank rate, leading to a larger repayment rate δ and more demand for loans Dbd (see
subsection 4.1). This increases the merchant bank’s proﬁt, see equation (7), and decreases its as-
sociated shadow price λb (see equation (A8) in Appendix A). Ceteris paribus, this yields a drop
in the ﬁrms borrowing rate rb through the ﬁrst order condition (A7) representing the supply
of loans by the merchant bank. The drop in rb increases the ﬁrms expected repayment rate as
well as the ﬁrms’ demand for loans, see equations (A2) and (A3). This mechanism matches the
intuition that liquidity injections are enhancing the economic activity or, put it differently, that
liquidity injections relieve the negative impact of an adverse shock.
The symmetric mechanism can be described on the upstream side of the interbank relationship.
The drop in i affects negatively the deposit bank’s proﬁt, even though this can be attenuated
by the increase in the merchant bank repayment rate δ. It transmits via its associated shadow
price λl, see equation (A11), of the deposit bank to a decrease in the interest rate on households
deposits. This has a decreasing effect on the households supply of deposits.
Having this process in mind, it is easier to understand how letting ν > 0 in the McCallum
rule (14) will modify the reaction of the economy after a - positive - productivity shock. This is
illustrated on Figure 8 which displays the impulse response function for some variables with
ν = 0 and ν = 10.22 Because of the quadratic investment adjustment costs at the ﬁrm level,
interest rates react negatively to the shock. This means that the central bank which applies rule
(14) will withdraw liquidity in order to stabilise the interbank interest rate. This triggers the
mechanism described earlier in this subsection, but in the opposite direction. On impact the
central bank favours the deposit bank, buying the excess of loans supply Dbs
t and preventing
the interbank rate to drop. On the other side, the lower drop in interest rates is detrimental
to merchant banks which lowers their loan supply to ﬁrms Lb
t, inducing a relative drop in the
ﬁrms repayment rate αt. On the short term, the impacts of the productivity shock are therefore
reduced by liquidity interventions.
Besidethisimpacteffect, thecentralbankinterventionhasadelayedeffect.Moneywithdrawals
sustain artiﬁcially the loans supply on the interbank market, and this makes the disequilibrium
more persistent. A more persistent disequilibrium means interest rates that remain below equi-
librium for longer, with the consequence that aftersome periods, the initial economy stabilizing
effect of the injection will turn into a procyclical one. This is clearly illustrated on Figure 8: the
repayment rate αt is reduced by the central bank intervention in the short run. But from the
22ν = 10 implies that central bank interventions represent on average 5% of the interbank market volume.
19moment money withdrawals bring the interbank interest rate below what it would have been
in the absence of intervention, αt increases with respect to its no-intervention level. As a result,
in the long run, liquidity interventions increase the persistence of the shock effects on economic
activity.
Note however that, whatever in the the short or in the long run, liquidity interventions un-
ambiguously lead to less ﬁnancial instability, measured as the volatility of the merchant bank
repayment rate.
































Figure 8: Effects of central bank liquidity interventions
4.4 Stylized facts and simulations results
As usual in the RBC literature, we would like to check if the quantative implications of our
model are realistic. To do so, we compute real data moments for interest rates, repayment
rates and production, and we compare these moments to those obtained from our simulated
data. Conversely to the standard RBC literature, our model allows to distinguish between three
different interest rates (deposit, interbank and borrowing) and to look at ﬁrm and bank default
rates. Real data moments are displayed in columns “data” of Table 3 and show (i) a weak
volatility of the interest and repayment rates (ii) a negative correlation between interest rates
and output (similar observations to (i) and (ii) could be found in US or EA data), (iii) procyclical
20repayment rates, (iv) countercyclical risk premium and (v) strong persistence of all variables.23
Simulatedmomentsarereportedincolumns“model”ofTable3. WeassumeaBaselIregulation
and the liquidity rule is chosen to obtain a realistic volatility of the interbank interest rate, i.e.
weset ν = 10inequation(14). Asaresult, centralbankinterventions(injectionsorwithdrawals
of liquidities) represent on average 5% of the interbank market volume. We show that our
model is able to generate realistic volatilities for all variables and to reproduce the negative
correlation of all the interest rates and the risk premium with output, the positive correlation
of the repayment rates, as well as the strong persistence. The liquidity rule obviously reduces
the interbank rate volatility (without liquidity interventions, the volatility would be about 6
times higher) but also reduces other interest rate volatilities and is therefore crucial for these
results. The negative correlation of interest rates with output is mainly due to the investment
cost: the investment demand cannot immediately jump after a positive productivity shock
which induces an initial fall in rb
t which is spread to the other interest rates. Finally, it is worth
noting that, except a large increase in the volatility of the risk premium (see section 4.2 for a
discussion), conducting the same simulations under a Basel II regulation would only slightly
change the results.
relative correlation ﬁrst-order
standard deviation with output autocorrelation
data model data model data model
rb
t 0.05 0.09 -0.58 -0.54 0.90 0.87
it 0.05 0.08 -0.43 -0.34 0.91 0.88
rl
t 0.05 0.08 -0.49 -0.33 0.92 0.88
rpt 0.01 0.02 -0.42 -0.98 0.76 0.94
αt NaN 0.01 NaN 0.87 NaN 0.96
δt 0.01 0.01 0.38 0.83 0.75 0.97
Nt 0.74 0.46 0.99 0.93 0.99 0.92
gdpt 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.92
All variables have been logged with the exception of the real interest rates and default rates. Real data: see Appendix B. rb
t :
borrowing rate, it : interbank rate, rl
t : deposit rate, rpt = rb
t − rl
t : risk premium, αt : ﬁrm repayment rate, δt : bank repayment
rate, Nt : employment, gdpt = Ct + Kt − (1− τ)Kt−1 + Fb
t + Fl
t − (1− ξb)Fb
t−1 − (1− ξl)Fl
t−1 : gross domestic product.
Table 3: Cyclical properties
23Real data are from Luxembourg and are only available from 1995Q1 until 2007Q3. Given the limited length
of this sample, we do not compute the business cycle deviations from the HP trend but from the mean. To get
comparable statistics, we follow the same approach with simulated data (split into sub-samples of 51 observations,
see Hendry (1984) for a discussion on the sampling methodology).
214.5 Optimal monetary policy
In our model, the instrument of the central bank policy is liquidity injections Mt and the policy
rule is given by equation (14):
Mt = ν (it − ¯ i).
In this section, we study the optimal rule to implement in case of disturbances (TFP shock). We








i.e. the central bank minimises output ﬂuctuations.24 Alternatively, we assume that the central







In Figure 9, we plot the values of L
gdp
0 and Lδ
0, obtained by simulating a second order approx-
imation of the model, for different values of ν (reaction to interbank rate deviations). We see
that a higher interbank rate stability (that is a higher ν) increases ﬁnancial stability. This re-
sult is obvious since the bank default rate 1 − δt directly depends on the interbank rate, see
equation (A6) and discussion in section 4.3. The effect of a higher interbank rate stability on
output stability is ambiguous: depending on the importance of the ν parameter, central bank
interventions according to a McCallum rule may either increase or decrease the volatility of the
economic activity. Indeed, section 4.3 shows that liquidity injections stabilise the economy in
the short run but not in the long run. The total resulting effect depends on the relative impor-
tance these two opposite forces. But in any case, the quantitative effect of the liquidity rule on
output ﬂuctuations is weak, with a loss function ﬂuctuating only between 8.19 and 8.23, that is
a 0.5% difference.25
Finally, moving from a Basel I regime to a Basel II regime helps to reduce further ﬁnancial
instability (the curve moves left) but increases output instability (the curve moves up). This last
result is obvious because of the procyclicality of Basel II, see again section 4.2 for a discussion.
24Since we do not have a nominal model, the central bank objective has nothing to do with nominal variables.
See for instance Woodford (2003) for an extensive discussion of optimal monetary policies.
25Pushing ν above 100 could strongly reduce further GDP ﬂuctuations (although leaving almost unchanged δt
ﬂuctuations), but this would imply very large liquidity operations (ν = 100 means that on average, central bank
interventions represent 20% of the interbank market volume).


























Figure 9: Optimal monetary policy: stabilising output vs. default rate
5 Conclusion
Over the past decade, ﬁnancial stability issues have become an important research ﬁeld for
academicsandaveryvisibleobjectiveforpolicymakersandcentralbanks. Amajorityofcentral
banks and several international ﬁnancial institutions, such as the IMF and the BIS, have begun
publishing regular reports on this ﬁeld. However, most of this research and analysis remain
descriptiveand/orbasedonpartialequilibriumanalysis. Wethinkthataconsistentframework
for ﬁnancial stability analysis must account for all linkages and diffusion processes, not only
between ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial sectors, but also within the ﬁnancial sector itself.
In this paper, we propose a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model (related to the RBC
literature) with an heterogeneous banking sector and endogenous default rates as in Goodhart
et al. (2005). We show that this credit market representation generates a ﬁnancial accelerator,
that Basel II is procyclical and that our model reproduces stylized facts on interest rates and
default rates. We also show that liquidity injections reduce ﬁnancial instability but have am-
biguous effects on the volatility of the rest of the economy.
This model is relatively simple and could be extended along several directions. First, here we
only focus on monetary injections, leaving aside the other main central bank policy instrument:
the ﬁxation of the repurchase rate. Proper modelisation of central bank behaviour (auctions at
a central bank determine repo rate and market-determined interbank rate with possibility of -
liquid - central bank interventions) would be interesting although probably not trivial. Second,
we have no nominal dimension in our model. An extension to a New-Keynesian framework
23(perfectly competitive ﬁrms need to be replaced by monopolistic wholesalers setting Calvo
prices and selling intermediate goods to perfectly competitive retailers) would make it possible
tostudytheeffectsofcentralbankbehaviouroninﬂation(andthereforetoincludeinﬂationinto
the loss function). We leave these works for future research.
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26A First order conditions
A.1 Firms
The optimisation yields the following ﬁrst order conditions, with λt deﬁned as the shadow
value of capital:
ǫtFNt = wt, (A1)






























+ ˜ βt+2 γ(1− αt+1)2Lb
t, (A3)
Lb






Equation (A1) equalises the marginal productivity of labour and wages. Equation (A2) deﬁnes
the marginal productivity of capital as its shadow value today minus its discounted shadow
value tomorrow, and equation (A3) says that the shadow value of capital today is equal to its
discounted expected cost (a fraction αt will be paid back tomorrow and a penalty cost on the
remaining fraction will be paid two periods ahead). Equation (A4) equalises the marginal cost
of paying back today to the discounted marginal search cost of tomorrow plus the marginal
disutility term.
A.2 Merchant banks
The maximization program yields:
λb
tDbd










= ˜ βt+1 λb







= ˜ βt+1 λb
t+1 αt+1 + ζb ˜ βt+2 λb


















The Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint (7) is represented by λb
t. Equation (A5)
is the trade off between paying back today and paying a penalty tomorrow. Equations (A6)
and (A7) are Euler equations respectively for borrowing (from the interbank market) and lend-
ing (to ﬁrms).
27A.3 Deposit banks
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and (A10) are Euler equations for respectively deposits (from households) and loans (to the
interbank market).
A.4 Households


















Equation (A12) is the Euler equation for consumption augmented with the deposit target term
and equation (A13) is the labour supply ﬁrst order condition.
B Data sources
Real quarterly Luxembourg data from 1995Q1 to 2007Q3. Daily and monthly data are trans-
formed to quarterly ones. Nominal data are deﬂated by the Eurozone HICP (monthly data
transformed to quarterly ones). We use the Eurozone HICP (instead of the Luxembourg one)
because this is the reference inﬂation for the conduct of the monetary policy and hence the in-
terest rate evolutions. Data presented in Figure 2 and used for the calibration are average over
the sample period. More precisely:
- Interbank loans: include all loans and advances to credit institutions, repayable on de-
mand or with agreed maturity. Data aggregated from individual bank balance sheets.
Source: Central Bank of Luxembourg.
- Market book: includes debt securities, other ﬁxed-income securities, shares and other
variable-yield securities. Data aggregated from individual bank balance sheets. Source:
Central Bank of Luxembourg.
28- Loans to private agents (non ﬁnancial companies): data aggregated from individual bank
balance sheets. Distinction is made between total loans (to resident and non resident
companies) and loans to only resident companies. Source: Central Bank of Luxembourg.
- Others (assets): deﬁned as the difference between total assets and the sum of market
book, interbank loans and loans to private companies.
- Interbank deposits: data aggregated from individual bank balance sheets. Source: Cen-
tral Bank of Luxembourg.
- Consumer deposits: include all consumer deposits, i.e. term and sight deposits. Data
aggregated from individual bank balance sheets. Source: Central Bank of Luxembourg.
- Own funds: subscribed capital plus reserves including the past proﬁts bring forward.
Data aggregated from individual bank balance sheets. Source: Central Bank of Luxem-
bourg.
- Proﬁts: data aggregated from quarterly loss and proﬁt account. Source: Central Bank of
Luxembourg.
- Others (liabilities): deﬁned as the difference between total liabilities and the sum of inter-
bank and consumer deposits, own capital and the proﬁt.
- Lending rate: quarterly average rate of lending to non ﬁnancial companies. Source: Cen-
tral Bank of Luxembourg.
- Interbank rate: until 1995, Belgian 3-month interbank rate (Eurostat), from 1996, Euribor
3-month (Bloomberg).
- Borrowing rate: quarterly average rate on consumer deposits. Source: Central Bank of
Luxembourg.
- Default rate for banks: see Appendix C.
- Capital ratio: related to the Basel II accord which deﬁnes the ratio as the sum of the two
components of the bank capital, i.e. Tier I and Tier II, divided by risk adjusted assets. The
latter are deﬁned by affecting each balance sheet and off-balance sheet asset into a risk
category (the riskier the assets, the larger the weight). The weight varies from zero to 150
percent. Source: Luxembourg supervisory authority (CSSF).
C Z-score: an application to Luxembourg bank default
The z-score index is a distance to default indicator (DD) calculated from bank’s balance sheet
and proﬁt account (rather than an option-based measure as the standard DD indicator). The
29advantageofthe z-score(bookvalue)relativetoDD (marketvalue)isthe possibilityto evaluate
the default risk of non listed companies.
The z-score is deﬁned as z = ( + k)/σ , where   is the average return on assets (ROA), k is the
ratio of own funds to total assets, and σ is the standard deviation of return on assets (ROA).
In other words, the z-score measures the number of standard deviations a return realization
would have to fall in order to deplete banks’ own funds, under the assumption of normality
of returns. As with DD, the higher level of the z-score the better is quality of the bank and the
lower is the probability of insolvency.
In this paper, we derived the z-score for Luxembourg individual banks from quarterly ﬁnancial
statements. The sample period covers 1994Q1 to 2007Q3. We adopt the Maechler et al. (2007)
approachanduseaeight-quarterrollingz-indexcalculatedfromthe8quartersmovingaverage
of the three above mentioned variables. We then take the logarithm of the result to get z.
As the z-score is, by assumption, normally distributed with a mean zero and a standard de-
viation equal 1, the probability of default of a bank i at time t is Pi
t = F(−zt), where F is the
cumulative distribution. The aggregate probabilities of default for the whole banking sector is
computed as the mean of individual probabilities.
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